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AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
50 EAST HURON STREET · CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60611 · 13121 944·6780 
September 8, 1989 
Jerald c. Newman, Chairman 
National Commission on Libraries and 
Information Science 
2001 Marcus Avenue, Suite N20 
Lake Success, NY 11042 
Dear Mr. Newman: 
Upon my return from the IFI.A meetings in Paris, I received your 
letter of 14 August, in which you dispute two references to NCLIS 
in my Inaugural Address. I do not agree that either of those 
remarks are in error, nor do I agree that either statement 
constitutes "distortion" of fact. 
A perusal of even the edited, blacked-out, transcript of NCLIS's 
14 January 1988 meeting with a FBI representative reveals that 
most of the NCLIS Commissioners who registered an opinion, 
including you, accepted and approved of the FBI's Library 
Awareness Program activities and of the Bureau's raison-d'etre 
for that Program as well. Any other interpretation of NCLIS's 
posture in that meeting strikes me as transparent dissembling. 
I described NCLIS's approval of the program as "unnecessary" and 
(
"outrageous." You may dispute that assessment if you wish, but 
the facts are such that you cannot dispute the collective 
opinions and persuasions of NCLIS Commissioners, including your 
I own, as set out in that transcript. 
\ 
What is obvious and disheartening throughout the document is the 
im licit notion that national secu · safe uards and · 
Amen e some ow mutually exclusive tenets. Further, 
there is evidence of a lac o compre ension regar ing how 
scientific information and data are organized and used in this 
country, or what constitutes sinister behavior in a U.S. 
scientific library. Let me repeat what I have said before; were 
I to accept the FBI's description of a potentially subversive 
patron as one bearing a foreign name or having a foreign accent 
who photocopies "a lot" or "steals" library materials, I would be 
obliged to report a patron of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology's Research Information Center who I know holds a 
security clearance and works on a contract for an intelligence 
agency of the U.S. government. I would need also to report the 
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names of a number of NIST scientists, statisticians, 
mathematicians and engineers, plus some of NIST's Guest 
Scientists, Engineers and Industrial Research Associates, as well 
as assorted persons from private sector corporations who use 
RIC's resources for their work. In sum, the FBI's assumptions 
about the characteristics of suspicious patrons of scientific 
libraries are seriously flawed. It is most unfortunate that not 
a single NCLIS Commissioner ever once questioned those 
assumptions. Instead, NCLIS appears to have embraced them whole 
cloth and without examination. 
Moreover, some of us believe that an unstated objective of the 
FBI's Library Awareness Program was and is to use the staffs of 
America's scientific libraries to identify persons who can later 
be "turned" by the FBI to become double agents. The FBI has 
been less than candid regarding this matter, and NCLIS has done 
nothing of record to inquire whether or not this is, in fact, 
part of the Bureau's strategy. How can the Commission be trusted 
to realistically or correctly advise the President and the 
Congress on matters pertaining to America's scientific libraries 
when it fails to recognize the possibility and implications of a 
scenario like this one? 
Since 1949, I have held U.S. government security clearances. I 
know quite well what precautions and responsibilities are assumed 
when one holds a clearance. Therefore, you will not be 
surprised to learn that I was dumfounded when, upon reading the 
transcript, I discovered that you convened a meeting which 
produced what former NCLIS Deputy Executive Director David Hoyt 
later called "sensitive and classified" information in the 
San Antonio Public Library, an uncleared, public area which 
appears to have been unswept as well. This must have been the 
case, because the obligatory statements regarding the security 
level of the meeting area and the security level of the 
discussion is missing from both the beginning and the end of the 
transcript. Yet, David Hoyt's letter of 19 February 1988 to Toby 
Mcintosh cites two sections of 5USC as reasons why "sensitive and 
classified" sections of the transcript of that San Antonio 
meeting in the Public Library were "blacked out by the FBI." God 
help the U.S. government if either intelligence sources or 
intelligence methods were discussed or identified in that 
meeting. 
From the foregoing, I am sure it is clear that I believe if any 
person or entity has public explaining to do, that entity is 
NCLIS. More precisely, you as NCLIS Chairman owe the library 
profession a public explanation. 
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As to my reference to the Khomeini's act of terrorism -- the 
Ayatollah called for the death of Salman Rushdie, the destruction 
of his book and all who assisted him or promoted his volume on 16 
February 1989. Between 17 and 28 February, library associations, 
book publishers, several book sellers, reporters, editorial 
writers, cartoonists, librarians, library educators, library 
students and library staffs throughout the country staged 
demonstrations or took to the airwaves, the TV and the newspapers 
to denounce the Khomeini's actions. In addition, many library 
schools and libraries held read-ins of Satanic Verses to 
demonstrate publicly their support of Rushdie to write what he 
chooses without being threatened with murder. Within the first 
two weeks after 16 February, such groups and individuals had 
publicly rejected -- at some peril to themselves -- the 
Khomeini's threats to kill and to censor. 
I said in Dallas and I say again that I "find it sad, shocking 
and a matter of concern" that NCLIS chose not to react at the 
time "Khomeini called for international censorship, book burning 
and murder." Frankly, delivering a statement to a select few in 
the relatively safe confines of a U.S. Senate hearing room one 
month and one day after such an abhorrent incident occurred does 
not, in my opinion, satisfy the obvious need for both timely, 
responsible leadership and an immediate public statement 
addressing the matter. 
!Taken together, these events cause me to doubt NCLIS's ability I function either effectively or credibly as an "honest broker," !much less as a national leader, on library and information science matters. to 
I had seen the 19 July Washington Post article you included with 
your letter. I must say, however, I do not understand why you 
sent it. You are aware, I trust, that 37USC, which stipulates 
the conditions under which U.S. patents are granted, provides for 
their public disclosure and release and denies their issuance if 
the proposed device, compound, etc., has been described 
previously anywhere in the world's published literature. For 
this reason, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office spends 
considerable money each year acquiring copies of foreign patents 
and accessing and translating foreign publications in a host of 
relevant fields. A chief method of acquiring foreign patents and 
foreign literature is by instituting patent and literature 
exchange agreements between the United States and other 
countries, including Eastern Bloc countries and the PRC. 
I do hope your inclusion of that article was not meant to imply 
that the FBI should continue its attempts at counterintelligence 
in the library stacks. Even a casual perusal of U.S. patent law 
t I 
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should dispel the notion that the theft of unclassified patents 
has an intelligence-related basis. Ill-gotten profits may well 
be a motive behind such thefts, but advancing the Soviet's 
capabilities to build better MIGs is not. For the record, 
37CFR1.ll provides specifically that 
"After a patent has been issued or a 
statutory invention registration has been 
published, the specification, drawings and 
all papers relating to the case in the file 
are open to inspection by the public, and 
copies may be obtained upon paying the fee 
therefore." 
That is, not only the patent document but all its accompanying 
papers are released to the public. Further, 35USC181 restricts 
inspection of certain patents and their files if their disclosure 
"might be detrimental to the national security," to only 
"responsible representatives authorized by a (defense) agency." 
Such patents are not made available to the public in any format. 
It is imperative, I believe, that NCLIS Commissioners 
distinguish between the FBI's two sets of responsibilities, 
namely, their responsibilities as police officers charged with 
investigating interstate crime on the one hand and their 
responsibilities as intelligence agents, charged with executing 
certain counterintelligence functions in CONUS on the other. 
The patent thefts fall in their first area of responsibility but 
it is their second area of responsibility which gave rise to the 
Library Awareness Program and ultimately, to our dispute. 
Having served as the Director of both classified and open 
scientific libraries in and out of government for over 35 years, 
and as a former Deputy Chief Librarian of the Patent and 
Trademark Office's Scientific Library, I very much hope that you 
and your NCLIS colLeagues will be sensitive to these differences. 
My husband, who has read the NCLIS/FBI transcript and who is a 
retired Air Force Intelligence Officer and a Life Member of the 
Association of Former Intelligence Officers, shares my concern in 
this regard. We believe President George Bush, who is also a 
Life Member of AFIO, would agree. 
Enclosure 
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P.S. I too enclose a copy of an article from a recent issue of 
the Washington Post, which points up a circumstance central to 
science and technology today, namely, more often than not, 
research in a given field proceeds simultaneously in several 
parts of the world. In the case of the vacuum microelectronics 
technology the article describes, work goes on in the U.S., 
Japan, Great Britain and the Soviet Union -- and I am quite 
certain that the past and future advances in this field will be 
reported in the open literature of all these countries. Let me 
illustrate. Since September, 1986, a member of my staff has run 
online searches monthly to determine how many times an article 
announcing a joint NIST/Israeli discovery has been cited by 
other scientists. From 1 January - 14 August 1989, that article 
was cited 167 times in articles on further developments prepared 
by other scientists; 55 (33%) of those articles appeared in 
foreign journals. Since not all foreign or U.S. scientists 
choose to publish in their own country, I checked the numbers of 
scientists residing and working in other countries who 
contributed to those 167 articles. The total was 118, 37 of 
which reside in either Eastern Bloc countries or the PRC and 81 
of which reside in countries we consider to be our allies -- or 
at least not our enemies at the moment. 
In sum, the United States is not now and has not been for some 
time a world leader in many scientific areas. This is not to say 
we are not ahead in inventing and discovering. What we fail to 
do well today, however, is to convert those inventions and 
discoveries into useful, marketable products and technologies. 
This circumstance has little to do with our nation's enemies or 
even our nation's friends. Rather, it results from U.S. 
industry's greater interest in the buy-out and the takeover than 
in funding long-term R&D or taking risks in new markets. It has 
to do with a semi-literate work force and a scientifically 
illiterate public, 94% of whom think DNA is a food additive and 
Chernobyl is a ski resort. Equally serious, it has to do with 
those past and present Congresses who destroyed or refuse now to 
restore industry's incentives to invest in this country's long-
term prosperity. The FBI can't remedy these maladies, nor can 
NCLIS or ALA -- that is, none can do it alone. It is important, 
however, for all to understand the real bases for many of our 
present scientific difficulties. 
cc: ~LIS Commissioners 
s. Martin, NCLIS Executive Director 
ALA Executive Board 
ALA Council 
P. G. Schuman, Chair, ALA Legislation Committee 
